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On Liberty of Thought and Discussion 
John Stuart Mill rests his argument against censorship on two plausible premises.  The 
first is that humans are fallible.  That is, we are always capable of getting things wrong 
and we can never be entirely sure that we have anything right.  In the past, people have 
been convinced that the Earth does not move, that the pharaohs were gods and that 
Newton’s physics provides the final truth about gravity.  We cannot know which of our 
present certainties future generations will reject.  Mill’s second premise is that we are 
corrigible.  Experience and critical discussion can improve our opinions.  Being fallible, 
we can never be sure that any particular change of mind takes us closer to the truth—
experience may have misled us, or we may have made some error of logic.  But the only 
way to correct such mistakes is yet more experience and critical discussion.  Our best 
hope of improving our opinions is to make them public, so that others may show us our 
errors. 
Mill laid out his argument for freedom of expression in the second section of On Liberty 
(‘liberty of thought and discussion’).  The core of his argument is that censorship 
prevents us from correcting errors by critical discussion.  If a forbidden opinion is true, 
we lose the opportunity to learn of its truth.  If a forbidden opinion is false, we lose the 
opportunity to remind ourselves why it is false.  The role of his second premise (that we 
are corrigible) is obvious.  If it were not possible to correct false opinions by discussion, 
there would be little point in insisting on the freedom to try.  Note, Mill need not claim 
that free criticism will always lead towards the truth.  All he needs to claim is that free 
discussion is our best hope of correcting error.  He appeals to his first premise (that we 
are fallible) explicitly in the rest of this section, where he elaborates and defends his 
simple dilemma.  For example, he considers the suggestion that freedom of expression is 
a good thing provided it does not extend to criticism of the fundamental orthodoxies on 
which society depends for its good order.  Mill replies that the more important an 
orthodoxy is, the more vital is the need to test it.  When legislators try to put a doctrine 
beyond criticism, they effectively claim to know, infallibly, that it is true.  Since we are 
fallible, this cannot be justified.  All silencing of discussion is, he says, an assumption of 
infallibility.  A little later, Mill addresses the thought that an orthodoxy might be too 
useful to endanger with criticism, quite aside from whether it is true.  No false belief, he 
insists, can be really useful.  Therefore, to claim to know that a belief is useful without 
allowing it to be tested, is in effect to claim to know, infallibly, that it is true.   
He adds a plausible development of the second horn of his dilemma: truths become stale 
for lack of opposition.  In the early days of a religion (or any other movement), its 
teaching is vivid and urgent because the believers must defend it against the established 
powers and doctrines of the day.  However, if the new religion joins the ranks of 
established powers and doctrines, it becomes something learned by rote and practised 
mechanically.  Therefore, defenders of orthodoxies should welcome opposition, to keep 
their own creeds fresh and active. 
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Nowadays, those who wish to protect religious doctrines from criticism make an 
argument that has more to do with the tender feelings of the believer than the truth or 
falsity of the doctrine.  The standard position among those who would limit our freedom 
to criticise religious doctrines and activities is that they welcome reasonable criticism.  
What they object to, and would like the law to prevent, is offensive or abusive mockery 
of their faith.  This position was already familiar in Mill’s day.  Mill argues against legal 
protection from offensive criticism on several grounds.  First, he observes that any 
vigorous and effective criticism, when passionately put, will seem intemperate to its 
target.  It is painful to have the logical deficiencies of one’s most cherished convictions 
publicly exposed.  We cannot outlaw criticism merely because it hurts.  (Notice: Mill’s 
‘harm principle’ says that the government may interfere with one person’s liberty only to 
prevent harm to another.  It does not say that the government must always intervene to 
prevent one from harming another.)  Second, he claims that it is very difficult to prove 
that a case or a party has been misrepresented.  Mill does not elaborate this point in On 
Liberty, but we can look to an earlier work on ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press’ 
(Westminster Review, III, 1825; On Liberty was published in 1859).  There, he argues that 
all criticism is to some degree offensive.  To make a criticism is to make some sort of 
accusation.  Even the most temperate, scholarly criticism involves accusing someone of 
overlooking something important, getting some fact wrong or making a logical mistake.  
Therefore, to ban every criticism that includes some element of invective opens the way 
for a ban on all criticism.  For this reason, Mill held that a law that tried to distinguish 
between temperate criticism and offensive abuse would be arbitrary, and that judges 
would exploit this arbitrariness in the service of the powerful.  Returning to On Liberty, 
he argues, third, that a law against offensive criticism would favour the politically 
powerful against the weak.  A member of a marginal group who vilifies an established 
orthodoxy would risk prosecution, while someone who vilifies the marginal group on 
behalf of the established opinion would receive praise for showing a proper zeal.  In any 
case, intemperate language is unproductive for defenders of minority opinions, because 
they have to put on a show of reasonableness in order to get a hearing at all.  Putting 
these last two points together: a law against offensive criticism would tell only against 
defenders of minority opinions, who are already motivated to appear moderate and 
reasonable.  For these reasons, Mill argues that the law should not attempt to regulate 
controversies. 
Notice that Mill argues for the freedom to express opinions.  His case depends on the fact 
that opinions may be true or false.  What then of art?  If we think that a work of art is a 
roundabout way of saying something, then works of art fall within the scope of Mill’s 
argument.  However, this is a rather crude and implausible view of art.  Works of art do 
not normally have clear messages that we can treat as statements and examine like 
opinions.  Nevertheless, those works of art that have attracted violent attempts at 
suppression in recent years do seem to have had something to say.  The Satanic Verses is 
(amongst other things) a meditation on geographical displacement and cultural 
hybridisation; Behzti is about power relations in the Sikh community; Theo van Gogh’s 
film Submission makes a similar point about Islam; the Danish cartoon that caused the 
most fuss was the one that suggested a connection between Islam and suicide terrorism; 
Jerry Springer the Opera seems to argue for the contemporary relevance of Biblical 
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stories.  These works are part of the discussion about religion, and consequently deserve 
the protection of Mill’s argument, even though they do not have unambiguous messages 
and are not true in the manner of a factual statement or false in the manner of a lie. 
Mill’s argument does not really make a case for free expression for its own sake, but 
rather argues for free discussion (as the title of the relevant section of On Liberty 
suggests).  The benefits he points to do not come from free expression alone.  At 
Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park, everyone has the right to stand on a box and speak, and 
many do.  No ideas are tested, no doctrines are examined, because there is no discussion, 
but only a cacophony of speech-making.  Mill certainly defends the free speech of Hyde 
Park corner, because such freedom of expression is a necessary condition for free 
discussion, but it is not sufficient.  The professions that live by testing ideas all have 
some formal rules that stipulate who may speak, when, and how, precisely to avoid the 
unproductive chaos of Speakers’ Corner.  Parliament, the law courts and academic 
conferences all have rules of procedure and evidence to prevent disputants from shouting 
each other down, lying, changing the subject, abusing each other or otherwise poisoning 
the wells of debate.  The details vary among these cases, but they share two important 
characteristics.  One is that they must be well-informed.  Parliamentarians can demand 
information from the Government, and consider it a serious offence against the spirit of 
the place if these demands are not satisfied.  Law courts can insist on receiving the 
information they need.  Academics and scientists consider it a scandal to hide or destroy 
awkward evidence.  The other is that the presiding power is absolute.  The speaker of the 
Commons has unruly parliamentarians ejected by the Sergeant at Arms, who carries his 
sword about to make this very point.  Judges have the last word in their courts.  The 
authority that binds academics is rather more diffuse, but editors, examiners and chairs of 
appointment committees are the absolute sovereigns of their small kingdoms.  This 
sovereignty of the chair is necessary to prevent the debating-procedure from becoming 
the object of the dispute.  To see the point, observe how in fragile or newly-constituted 
states, the formation of a government is often held up by wrangling over the process for 
forming a government. 
There is therefore a tension in Mill’s position.  His argument for liberty of expression is 
in fact an argument for liberty of discussion.  The proper conclusion of his argument is 
not merely that we should have a right to express ourselves— the existence of Speakers’ 
Corner guarantees that right.  Rather, we should be able to express our convictions in a 
forum where they will be taken seriously and criticised fairly.  But to offer this as a 
matter of right, the state would have to give society as a whole the character of a debating 
society, law court or parliamentary assembly.  The first requirement (that of free access to 
information) presents no problem for Mill’s liberalism.  For example, Mill would surely 
welcome a stronger freedom of information act that made it more difficult for public and 
private institutions to hide their sins behind the cloaks of ‘national security’ and 
‘commercial confidentiality’ respectively.  The problem arises from the second 
requirement.  An effective debating forum must have a sovereign presiding authority, to 
play the role of speaker, chair or judge.  As we have seen, Mill thought that the law 
should not attempt to regulate debate, because such regulation would allow the powerful 
to silence the weak.  But without such regulation, liberty of discussion cannot be 
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guaranteed.  This tension is not Mill’s alone.  For example, on the one hand the laws of 
libel as they currently operate in England make it easy for rich people to bully 
newspapers and magazines.  But if the libel laws were weakened, editors would print 
even more salacious distortions and lies than they currently do.  On the other hand, the 
Press Complaints Commission is an industry body and does nothing to check the natural 
preference of newspapers for profit over responsible reporting.  But if a government 
agency (Off-Hack?) took over the job, it would come under pressure to force newspapers 
to report on the government as the government would wish to be reported on. 
We might hope to take refuge in another of Mill’s principles: variety.  Mill favoured 
variety in all things for two reasons.  First, the greater the variety of experience and 
opinion can be brought to bear on a question, the more likely we are to find the correct 
answer.  Second, Mill valued individuality for its own sake, and a culture that encourages 
diversity in lifestyles is less likely to stifle or crush individuality.  Mill united these two 
thoughts in his phrase ‘experiments in living’.  We might take inspiration from the 
example of academia, where there are many forums, presided over by many (largely 
benign) despots.  An academic who finds himself excluded as a crank from one forum 
can take his thoughts to another, where they might find constructive criticism.  In fact, 
this differentiation of academia into many sub-sub-specialisms tends to reduce 
confrontations between opposing world-views and in the worst cases produces conclaves 
of true believers.  The real problem, however, is that to ensure a diversity of forums in 
society at large, the government would have to take powers that it would inevitably 
abuse.  If, for example, it took powers to prevent a single company or individual from 
controlling too many of the major news outlets, it (or a successor administration) would 
inevitably use those powers with an eye on its own benefit.  A large media group that 
criticised the government severely might find itself judged to be too large.  In any case, 
increasing the number of media companies does not necessarily increase the diversity of 
perspectives. 
In the final paragraph of the section of On Liberty dedicated to freedom of discussion, 
having argued that the government should not attempt to regulate public debate, Mill 
expresses his confidence that there are many controversialists who try to deal fairly with 
their opponents.  Before we considered the alternatives, this might have seemed like a 
feeble piety.  Mill’s argument for liberty of discussion suggests that we have a right to 
express our opinions in a well-regulated forum.  When we have a right to something, we 
usually demand that there be a robust mechanism to ensure that we get whatever it is.  
We do not expect to rely on the willingness of others to respect our right.  Indeed, the 
chief point of a right is that you still have it even if you have made yourself so unpopular 
that the majority would prefer not to give you whatever it is that your right guarantees.  
However, a robust mechanism to ensure our right to free discussion would put greater, 
perhaps excessive, power into the hands of government.  For this good Millean reason, 
the goodwill of controversialists may be our best, indeed our only hope for true liberty of 
discussion. 
